The Allahabad High Court has upheld the validity of Statute 40(3)(b) of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) Statutes, rejecting a constitutional challenge that claimed the provision allowing termination of a teacher through a two-thirds majority vote of the Executive Council violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that the provision cannot be described as manifestly arbitrary because it operates only after a teacher has been given a full disciplinary inquiry and an opportunity to defend herself.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, a faculty member of Aligarh Muslim University, challenged both her termination from service and the constitutional validity of Statute 40(3)(b). She argued that the provision was unconstitutional because it does not expressly require the Executive Council to provide the concerned employee with a hearing before taking the final decision through voting, nor does it require the Council to record reasons for its decision.
During the proceedings, the Division Bench asked the petitioner to clarify whether she wished to pursue the challenge to the termination on facts or confine the case to the constitutional validity of the statute. The petitioner chose to press the challenge to the vires of the statutory provision before the Division Bench.
The University opposed the plea, contending that the disciplinary proceedings had followed the statutory procedure. According to AMU, the petitioner had received a show-cause notice, a charge memorandum, an inquiry, and multiple inquiry reports before the matter was finally placed before the Executive Council for voting.
Court's Observations
A Division Bench comprising Justice Arindam Sinha and Justice Satya Veer Singh closely examined the complete framework of Statute 40 rather than reading sub-clause (b) in isolation.
The Bench observed that Statute 40(3)(a) and 40(3)(c) specifically require disciplinary proceedings before dismissal for misconduct. Those provisions ensure that a teacher is informed of the allegations, receives a reasonable opportunity to present a defence, can inspect evidence, cross-examine witnesses and produce evidence before the inquiry authority. Only after completion of this process does the Executive Council consider the matter and vote.
Rejecting the argument that the voting provision itself was arbitrary, the Court noted:
“The statute came to be by operation of provision in section 28 of the Act... a teacher is afforded reasonable opportunity of defending allegation against her conduct and only after the procedure of inquiry is duly completed can the matter of her removal be placed before the Executive Council for vote, requiring 2/3rd majority.”
The Bench further observed that merely because the Executive Council records the outcome of a vote without separate reasons does not make the statutory mechanism unconstitutional. Earlier during the hearing, the Court had remarked that when a decision is taken by members entitled to vote, the resolution naturally records whether the motion has been carried or rejected rather than detailed reasons.
Reliance on Supreme Court Decisions
The University relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., arguing that legislation cannot be invalidated solely on the ground that it is arbitrary unless it violates a constitutional provision.
The petitioner, on the other hand, referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, which recognises that legislation may be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14.
After considering both precedents, the High Court concluded that Statute 40 does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness because adequate procedural safeguards are built into the disciplinary process before the Executive Council exercises its voting power.
Court's Decision
The High Court held that the constitutional challenge to Statute 40(3)(b) could not succeed and refused to declare the provision unconstitutional. The Bench found sufficient procedural safeguards within the statutory scheme to prevent arbitrary action.
However, the Court clarified that the petitioner is at liberty to file a fresh writ petition limited to challenging her termination on factual grounds. It also observed that if such a petition is filed by the prescribed date, the petitioner may seek exclusion of the time spent prosecuting the present writ petition while explaining any delay.
The writ petition was accordingly disposed of.
Case Details
Case Title: Dr. Tanzeem Fatima v. Aligarh Muslim University Through Vice Chancellor & 2 Others
Case Number: WRIT - A No. 31741 of 2014
Judge: Justice Arindam Sinha and Justice Satya Veer Singh
Decision Date: 14 July 2026
