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Consensual Sexual Relationship Between Adults Cannot Constitute Rape Merely Because Marriage Did Not Materialise: Gauhati High Court

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Gauhati High Court acquits a man under IPC Section 376 and POCSO Act after finding the victim was 18 and the relationship was consensual. - Dipan Ghosh alias Dipon Ghosh v. The State of Assam & Anr.

Consensual Sexual Relationship Between Adults Cannot Constitute Rape Merely Because Marriage Did Not Materialise: Gauhati High Court

The Gauhati High Court has set aside the conviction of a man under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, holding that the prosecution failed to establish that the woman was below 18 years of age when their sexual relationship began.

A Division Bench of Justice Michael Zothankhuma and Justice Sanjeev Kumar Sharma observed that the medical evidence placed the woman's age between 17 and 18 years, and the permissible margin of error in the ossification test had to be considered. The Court ultimately treated her as an adult at the relevant time and held that the relationship was consensual.

The Court accordingly acquitted the appellant and directed his immediate release from custody, if he was not wanted in another case.

Background

The appeal arose from a 2025 judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Karimganj, which had convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under the IPC and 20 years under the POCSO Act.

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The complaint alleged that the woman was 16 years old when the relationship began and that the appellant had established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage. The matter came to light after she became pregnant. According to the complaint, the appellant later refused to marry her.

The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the woman's age had not been properly established and that the evidence indicated a consensual relationship.

The Bench noted that although a birth certificate showing the woman's date of birth as October 2, 1995, was available, it had never been exhibited during the trial. Therefore, the Court examined the medical evidence, including the radiological and ossification test findings.

The medical report placed her age between 17 and 18 years. The Court explained that an ossification test cannot establish a person's exact age and that a margin of error must be considered.

The Bench observed:

"Though there is a doubt as to whether the benefit of ± 1 or 2 years to a child in conflict with law is to be given, it is settled law that in the event of there being two views, one in favour of the accused and one in favour of the State, the view leaning in favour of the accused should be accepted."

The Court further held that even if a one-year margin was applied, the woman would have been 18 years old at the relevant time.

The Bench also considered the differences between the woman's testimony before the trial court and her statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC. The Court found that her accounts differed even regarding the place where the alleged incidents had occurred.

The judges noted that the prosecution had alleged that the first incident was forcible, while the subsequent sexual encounters were consensual. However, the Bench was not persuaded by the allegation of force in view of the inconsistencies in the evidence.

The judgment stated:

"We have also noticed that on account of the evidence of the victim not being corroborated with her statement made under section 164 Cr.PC, even with regard to the place of occurrence, the statement of the victim to the effect that the first incident of sexual intercourse was forceful, cannot be accepted by us, as it does not appear to be truthful."

The Court further considered the fact that the relationship had continued through numerous sexual encounters and had resulted in pregnancy and the birth of a child. It concluded that the relationship was consensual and that the subsequent refusal to marry could not, by itself, turn those acts into a forcible sexual relationship.

The Bench observed:

"The consensual sexual act between the parties cannot be said to be forceful, only on account of a change in the relationship between the two parties, which in our view, would not attract the provisions of either the IPC or the POCSO Act, as the age of the victim would have to be considered to be above 18 at the time of the incident and as a sexual relation between two consenting adults cannot be said to be an offence."

The High Court held that the trial court's conviction and sentence were not sustainable. It accordingly set aside the March 26, 2025 judgment and acquitted the appellant of charges under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The Bench directed that he be released immediately from judicial custody, provided he was not required in any other case.

The Court also pointed out that the trial court had imposed separate sentences under both provisions, contrary to Section 42 of the POCSO Act, which requires punishment under the provision carrying the greater degree of punishment where the same act attracts both laws. However, this issue became irrelevant after the conviction was set aside.

The appeal was accordingly allowed.

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