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Supreme Court: Mention of Section 307 IPC in FIR Doesn't Prevent Quashing of Case if Allegations Are Unfounded

Shivam Y.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in an FIR does not bar the High Court from quashing the case if the facts do not support the charge. The judgment emphasizes the need for courts to assess whether the offense is genuinely made out before denying quashing.

Supreme Court: Mention of Section 307 IPC in FIR Doesn't Prevent Quashing of Case if Allegations Are Unfounded

The Supreme Court recently ruled that the mere presence of Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) in an FIR does not automatically prevent the quashing of a case. It stated that courts must scrutinize whether the charge is actually supported by evidence before making a decision.

This judgment was delivered in the case of Naushey Ali & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr., where the appellants had approached the Supreme Court after the Allahabad High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings against them despite a settlement between the parties.

Case Background

The case stemmed from an incident that occurred on August 11, 1991, in the village of Barwara Khas, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose over irrigation water, leading to a confrontation between two groups. Following this altercation, both parties filed FIRs against each other.

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The first FIR was lodged by the appellants on the same day, alleging offenses under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506, 323, and 504 IPC. Subsequently, on August 27, 1991, the complainant’s party filed a counter-FIR against the appellants under the same sections.

After an investigation, the police filed a closure report on September 7, 1991, stating that the case against the appellants was false and merely a retaliatory measure. However, on September 5, 1992, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad, rejected the closure report and summoned the accused for trial.

The accused approached the Allahabad High Court in 1992 seeking to quash the proceedings, but the case remained pending for more than two decades. It was eventually dismissed in 2015, though the appellants only learned about this in 2022 when they received fresh summons from the trial court.

In the meantime, a compromise was reached on December 19, 2022, between the accused and the complainant, Mahmood. Following this agreement, the accused moved an application under Section 482 CrPC in the High Court, requesting quashing of the case based on the settlement. The High Court, however, rejected their plea on January 19, 2023, citing that Section 307 IPC is a non-compoundable offense and therefore cannot be settled through compromise.

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When the matter reached the Supreme Court, it observed that the High Court failed to distinguish between "compounding of an offense" and "quashing of proceedings." The Court referred to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, where it was held that quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement is not the same as compounding of an offense.

The Court reiterated that mere mention of Section 307 IPC in an FIR should not automatically prevent the High Court from considering a compromise. Courts must assess whether the offense is genuinely made out by evaluating factors such as the severity of injuries, the nature of the attack, and the type of weapon used.

Relying on State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that certain serious offenses cannot be quashed based solely on a settlement, particularly those that significantly impact society. However, it also held that the High Court must examine whether the invocation of Section 307 IPC is justified and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charge.

In this particular case, the Supreme Court noted that the primary injury involved was a fracture of the head of the distal phalanx of the left ring finger. There was no evidence of life-threatening harm, and the main accused, Abdul Waris, who allegedly fired a weapon, had already passed away. The police investigation had also dismissed the case as false.

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Considering these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that no offense under Section 307 IPC was actually made out. The injuries did not indicate an intention to kill, and the role of the accused was vague, with no specific actions attributed to them.

The Court emphasized that continuing the trial after 33 years when both parties had resolved their differences would be a grave abuse of judicial process. It highlighted that the original FIR filed by the appellants’ party had already been settled years ago, further justifying the need to quash the present case.

The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s order and quashed the criminal proceedings. It ruled that, based on the overall circumstances, the nature of the weapon, and the severity of injuries, the case did not warrant prosecution under Section 307 IPC.

This ruling serves as a crucial precedent, reinforcing that courts must exercise due diligence in cases involving serious charges like Section 307 IPC. Simply mentioning such an offense in an FIR does not mean that the case cannot be quashed, particularly when the allegations do not justify the charge.

By clarifying this legal position, the Supreme Court has ensured that justice is not denied due to procedural rigidity. Courts must always weigh the facts, evidence, and the broader impact on justice before deciding whether to continue or quash a criminal case.

Case Title: Naushey Ali & Ors. Versus State of U.P. & Anr.