The Supreme Court has set aside the termination of a woman assistant teacher, holding that the departmental inquiry against her was vitiated by a reasonable likelihood of bias because key positions in the school management and inquiry committee were occupied by close family members.
A Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan allowed the appeal filed by Kiran Bhujade and restored the School Tribunal, Nagpur's order directing her reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The Court also directed the Education Officer to consider the feasibility of absorbing her in another 100% grant-in-aid school.
Background
Kiran Bhujade was appointed as an Assistant Teacher at the school on July 1, 2009. Her appointment was subsequently approved by the Education Officer with effect from the same date.
After the school received 20% grant-in-aid status in 2016, Bhujade alleged that the management excluded her name from the salary grant bills, depriving her of the financial benefits available to eligible employees. She approached the education authorities, following which an inquiry committee was constituted to examine her complaint.
Meanwhile, the school management initiated disciplinary proceedings against her over alleged misconduct, including tampering with documents. A departmental inquiry followed, and she was terminated from service on February 23, 2022.
The School Tribunal initially set aside the termination and ordered her reinstatement. However, the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, subsequently overturned that decision on April 29, 2025, prompting Bhujade to approach the Supreme Court.
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the composition and circumstances surrounding the inquiry created a reasonable likelihood of bias.
The Court noted that Rajesh Masurkar, the institution's Secretary, had initiated disciplinary proceedings, issued the charge-sheet, appeared as a principal management witness and signed the termination order. Meanwhile, the inquiry committee's Convenor, Prakash Masurkar, was his real brother.
The Court also noted that Rajesh Masurkar was the sole witness on 11 of the 20 charges. It therefore rejected the management's argument that his participation was merely formal.
Explaining the importance of impartiality, the Court observed:
"The requirement of impartiality is not restricted to the absence of direct pecuniary interest, but encompasses every circumstance that creates a reasonable apprehension that the proceedings were pre-determined or biased."
The Bench clarified that an employee does not need to establish actual bias or prove a specific incident of prejudice. The relevant test is whether a reasonable and fair-minded person, possessing the relevant information, would apprehend a real possibility of bias.
The management argued that the appointment of Prakash Masurkar was permissible under Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981.
Rejecting this defence, the Supreme Court observed that two unrelated members of the Executive Committee were available to be nominated to the inquiry committee. Therefore, the doctrine of necessity, which permits an otherwise disqualified person to act when no alternative authority is available, could not be invoked.
The Court also rejected the argument that Bhujade had waived her objection to the Convenor's appointment, finding that she had consistently challenged his involvement.
Holding that the inquiry suffered from a fundamental defect, the Bench stated:
"Bias affecting the root of the disciplinary mechanism is not a curable procedural irregularity but a foundational illegality which vitiates the entire proceedings."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Bombay High Court's judgment dated April 29, 2025, and restored the School Tribunal's order dated March 21, 2024, directing Bhujade's reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages.
The Court further directed the Education Officer to consider the feasibility of absorbing her in another 100% grant-in-aid school under Rule 26(2)(iii) of the MEPS Rules.




